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Introduction and Summary
Changes in inventory investment are widely regarded as a major
indicator of cyclical instability in the American economy, and have
been closely followed in recent years by economists, businessmen,
and the press.This study deals principally with the behavior of
manufacturers' stocks—the principal component of nonfarm inven-
tories—since the end of World War II.Available aggregates for all
manufacturers, durable-goods manufacturers, and nondurable-goods
manufacturers, as well as certain commodity series, are used.At-
tention is concentrated on the period 1947—56, although certain
parts of the analysis have been extended to the end of 1958 in order
to include the 1957—58 business cycle contraction.Comparisons are
also made with prewar behavior when information is available.
A major objective has been to test the relevance for the postwar
years of the principal findings and hypotheses of Moses Abramovitz
as set forth for the interwar years in his "Inventories and Business
Cycles, With Special Reference to Manufacturers' Inventories." 1
Since his earlier investigation has influenced the approach and organi-
zation of this study, it is well to comment here on Abramovitz'
work.His most important contributions were the determination of
typical patterns of timing and the relative importance of movements
in manufacturers' inventories during the interwar business cycles,
the development of an explanation for the patterns he found, and the
conclusion that the overall movement in manufacturers' stocks should,
for purposes of analysis, be regarded as a complex of somewhat dis-
similar movements of a number of different types of stocks.
In spite of severe limitations necessitated by principal reliance on
annual data, Abramovitz was able to estimate the timing of stocks and
inventory investment at business cycle turns, and to establish the
general magnitude of movements in expansions and contractions.
In studying the behavior of the various components, he analyzed
stocks successively at each stage of fabrication (i.e., purchased ma-
terials, goods in process, finished goods), breaking down these classes
still further in an attempt to establish the nature and significance of
the patterns of movement.Essentially he tried to determine the size
of each type of stock and the factors which influenced its fitictuations,
examining such commodity series as were available in order to check
his hypotheses and shed additional light on cyclical characteristics.
The organization of the present study is similar to Abramovitz'.
Chapter 2examinesthe importance of nonfarm and manufacturers'
inventory investment in the postwar and prewar periods.Chapter 3
analyzes the behavior of total stocks held by all manufacturers, dur-
able-goods and nondurable-goods manufacturers, and by individual
industries.In chapters 4, 5,and6 the behavior of stocks by stage of
fabrication is treated in the sequence of purchased materials, finished
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goods, and goods in process.Chapter 7 summarizes the timing char-
acteristics and describes the behavior of manufacturers' inventories as
a composite of these three major types of stocks.Chapter 8 examines
the manner in which inventory investment movements contribute to
cyclical instability.Finally, an appendix is provided containing notes
on sources and methods of processing the data, as well as the principal
time series used.
For the convenience of the reader the conclusions in chapters 2
through 8 are summarized below:
Changes in nonfarm inventory investment, as indicated in chapter
2, have contributed significantly to business cycle contractions.Mea-
sured on the basis of annual data, they have accounted for at least 42
percent of the decline in national product in every business cycle
contraction of the interwar and postwar periods except that of 1929—
32.With this exception, there is no evidence that the role of move-
ments in nonf arm. inventory investment during business cycle con-
tractions has changed significantly since the prewar period.
Movements in nonfarm inventory investment have contributed to
changes in national product to a lesser degree during expansions than
during contractions—a tendency which has increased since World
War II.This is due to the greater length of postwar expansion
phases, as well as to the earlier occurrence of the peaks in inventory
investment.
Movements in manufacturers' inventory investment have played a
somewhat larger role since the war, accounting for 83 percent of those
in nonfarm inventory investment, compared with 56 percent in the
prewar period.Although turns in manufacturers' inventory invest-
ment have led business cycle turns since the war, investment move-
ments have conformed closely to general business contractions, the
sharpest declines occurring between cyclical peaks and troughs.
Chapter 3 shows that total manufacturers' stocks have lagged
behind business cycle turns from 1 to 8 months, in contrast to Abrarno-
vitz' estimate of a 6-to-12-month prewar lag.Manufacturers' in-
ventory investment has moved in well-defined cyclical patterns and
has demonstrated a high degree of conformity to business cycles.
Timing of the total inventory investment series relative to business
cycles varied from roughly coincident to a lead 0114 months.
The durable-goods inventory and investment series have been
cyclically more sensitive than those of nondurable goods, conforming
more closely to business cycle movements and moving with greater
amplitude.The explanation appears to be that the production and
sale of these goods are subject to greatec amplitude of movement and
that fluctuations in these industries tend, to. occur at about the same
time.In addition, of stocks held at each stage of fabrication, durables
appear to be more responsive to cyclical influences.
Manufacturers' inventories are significantly smaller relative to sales
than before World War II.Moreover, composition has changed—
from approximately 40 percent purchased materials, 20 percent goods
in process, and 40 percent finished goods before the war—to an esti-
mated 38, 29, and 33 percent in 1952—53.The principal reason for
this change is the increased importance of the durable-goods industries
which carry larger goods-in-process stocks.
The purchased-materials stocks discussed in chapter 4 conform
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peaksthan at troughs.Turns tend to coincide with business cycle
peaks and to lag at troughs.On the other hand, investment leads
all turns.In these movements the durables series show a higher
conformity and greater amplitude.
Abramovitz' theory, although it goes far to explain the general
behavior of purchased-materials inventories and investment, does not
provide for the occurrence of certain observed timing in the inventory
and investment series.Moreover, it fails to consider the possible
role of unfilled order backlogs, availability of materials, and price
behavior of purchased goods in influencing inventory behavior.In
an effort to provide a fuller explanation, these influences are examined.
It is noted that the amplitude of purchased-materials investment
movement appears to be related to the size and direction of movement
of unfilled order backlogs and that the timing of investment tends to
agree with certain measures of availability of materials.Price changes
though significant do not appear to play a vital causal role.
Finally, inventory objectives and purchasing policy of firms vary
cyclically, moving in general agreement with changes in availability
of materials and realized investment.
Postwar finished-goods behavior (ch. 5) was studied by analyzing
two sets of inventory data.The first was composed of data for 25
commodities, representing the largest component of finished goods:
staple made-to-stock commodities.The second was composed of
Department of Commerce industry data.Among the commodity
series, finished stocks are found to move in a strongly inverted fashion
relative to sales or output, but with a well-developed tendency to
turn and come into phase as the duration of the activity phase in-
creases.The Department of Commerce industry data reveal a con-
sistent tendency for stocks to lag behind sales and reference turns, but
movements are rarely of the completely inverted sort observed in the
commodity series.It is concluded that the staple made-to-stock
inventories contribute a strong tendency toward inverted behavior,
but that other categories offset inverted tendencies to a significant
degree.
Study of inventory investment data for the 25 commodities reveals
that investment moves in an inverted fashion relative to rates of
change in sales, but that peaks (troughs) in inventory investment ]ead
or turn coincidentally with troughs (peaks) in rates of change in
activity.Since peaks and troughs in the latter tend to occur well
before the end of each business cycle phase, inverted movements in
finished-goods inventory investment may be expected to terminate
relatively early in the business cycle phase.Analysis of finished-goods
inventory investment in the Dep9rtment of Commerce series shows
this to be the case.Total manufacturers' finished-goods investment
turns roughly coincidently with business cycle turns or moves in an
inverted fashion (i.e., lags) for only a few months in the early part of
a business cycle phase.
Problems of deflation render conclusions regarding goods-in-process
behavior less dependable than those for purchased materials and
finished goods, but certain characteristics may be noted (ch. 6).The
deflated inventory series conform to business cycles with virtually
coincident timing at four of the six reference cycle turns, and inven-
tory investment leads all business cycle turns.Analysis of timing
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and investment, goods in process lead or turn coincidently with
purchased materials and lead the finished-goods series.
Although these findings are generally consistent with Abramovitz'
theory, irregularities in timing appear, particularly among the indi-
vidual industry investment series, which cannot be explained by his
analysis.Moreover, durable-goods investment appears to be influ-
enced by levels of unfilled orders in a manner similar to purchased
materials.Three factors seem to contribute to this behavior.(1) The
composition of postwar goods in processisdifferent from that
observed by Abramovitz.Owing to the increased role of durables,
there is a much larger proportion of these stocks held by industries
engaging in. discontinuous processes—roughly 50 percent compared
with his estimate of 36 percent.(2) Goods-in-process stocks in
discontinuous-process industries are likely to be held in substantial
quantities between stages.These stocks may be expected to rise
and fall in a manner similar to that of purchased materials.(3)
Goods held within stages need not fluctuate in as close conformity
to changes in output as Abramovitz maintained.
In chapter 7, analysis of amplitude of investment movements reveals
that inventory change has contributed significantly to cyclical insta-
bility at each stage of fabrication, the three components combining
to form a total manufacturing inventory complex which is highly
sensitive to cyclical forces.A summary of timing measures indicates
that purchased-materials and goods-in-process inventories and invest-
ment tend to have similar timing characteristics, leading turns in the
comparable finished-goods series.But the last lags behind the other
investment series by no more than 6 months at four of the six business
cycle turns, and shows almost no countercyclical tendencies.
A brief comparison of Abramovitz' estimates of prewar timing with
postwar findings is presented.Where timing differences are noted,
possible reasons for the differences are discussed.
Chapter 8 attempts to answer two fundamental questions: How do
changes in inventory investment contribute to the cumulative forces
of business cycle expansion and contraction?Is it possible that move-
ments in inventory investment may spark the upswing or bring about
the downturn, thereby constituting an underlying cause as well as an
aggravating force?
In an examination of Lloyd Metzler's theory of the inventory cycle,
it is noted that, in addition to the forces he discusses, inventory move-
ments may be influenced by cyclical changes in the availability o
goods and in the purchasing policies of firms.Inventory objectives
may vary to a considerable degree as the expansion progresses and
may be sharply revised when goods become readily available.More-
over, in making purchasing decisions, firms consider not only inven-
tories on hand but also unfilled purchase orders.In the theory
presented here it is held that changes in inventory objectives may
contribute to cyclical instability and, under certain conditions, cause
inventory investment to reverse, thereby contributing to a. turn in
the cyclical tide.